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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utan Supreme Court assigned this case to
the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition on June 12, 1989
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2) (h).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This

is

an

appeal

from

a

Special

Verdict

and

Judgment in favor of the Defendants in the District Court.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Should the Special Verdict and resulting Judgment
in favor of Michael Lahey, M.D. ("Dr.

Lahey") be affirmed

where;
1.

No

evidence

was

introduced

at

trial

to

establish the standard of care applicable to Dr. Lahey, any
breach of that standard, and any injury which such breach
may have caused;
2.

The jury found that there was no negligence on

the part of Dr. Lahey;
3.

No party asked for a new trial with respect to

-1-

the claim against Dr. Lahey;
4.

No party has challenged the Judgment in favor

of Dr. Lahey on appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This
claims

to

is

have

an

action

sustained

for
as

a

damages
result

which
of

the

Plaintiff
alleged

professional negligence of L.D.S. Hospital, Kimball Lloyd,
M.D. (Dr. Lloyd), and Dr. Lahey in providing health care
services for Betty George.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

This case was tried before Judge Pat B. Brian with
a jury between October 31, 1988 and November 9, 1988.

The

jury returned a Special Verdict in favor of the Defendants
on November 9, 1988.

Plaintiff moved for a New Trial or

Judgment

Notwithstanding

the

Verdict;

Judgment

Notwithstanding

the

Verdict

withdrawn.
denied

the
was

Motion

for

subsequently

Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial was heard and

on January 27, 1989.

The final Judgment of the

District Court was entered on March 2, 1989; Plaintiff's

-2-

Notice of Appeal was filed on March 31, 1989.

C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

The Judgment of the District Court held as follows:
1.

L.D.S.

Hospital

through

its

nursing

staff

and/or respiratory therapists was negligent in the care of
Betty George.
2.

The negligence of L.D.S. Hospital was not a

proximate cause of death of Betty George and the damages
claimed by Plaintiff.
3.

Dr. Lloyd was not negligent in his care of

Betty George.
4.

Dr. Lahey was not negligent in his care of

Betty George.

D.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The relevant facts giving rise to the case are as
follows:
1.
Hospital

Betty

commencing

George
on

was

June

28,

hospitalized
1986

for

at
an

L.D.S.

abdominal

hysterectomy and exploratory surgery relative to an internal
mass and Defendants provided health care services to her.
(Plaintifffs

Complaint,

Par.

-3-

11-17,

R.

4-5;

Answer

of

Michael Lahey, M.D. (Par. 6, R. 27.)
2.

Surgery was performed on July 29, 1986.

An

abdominal mass was located and removed and found to be a
benign cyst.
3.

(Plaintiff's Complaint, Par. 13, R. 3-4.)
Subsequent to the surgery, Dr. Lahey

provided health care services to Betty George as an internal
medicine consultant.

(Plaintiff's Complaint, Par. 14 R. 5;

Answer of Michael Lahey, M.D., Par. 6, R. 27.)
4.
cardiac

On August

arrest and

2, 1986, Betty George suffered a

subsequently

died on August 4, 1986.

(Plaintiff's Complaint, Par. 16 and 17, R. 27); Answer of
Michael Lahey, M.D. Par. 5, R. 27.)
5.

Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Lahey violated the

applicable standard of care and that as a proximate result
of this conduct Betty George suffered a cardiac arrest and
subsequent death which resulted in injuries and damage to
Plaintiff.
6.
standard

(Plaintiff's Complaint, Par. 26 and 27, R. 8-9.)
No evidence was introduced at trial as to the

of care applicable

to Dr. Lahey, breach of the

standard of care, or causation.
7.

(R. 764-768.)

The Special Verdict of the jury found that Dr.

Lahey was not negligent in his care of Betty George.
397; Special Verdict - Addendum "A".)

-4-

(R.

8.

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

New

Trial

did

not

challenge the Special Verdict and Judgment in favor of Dr.
Lahey.

(R. 638, 653; Motion for New Trial and Affidavit of

Counsel for Plaintiff - Addendum

,f

B".)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Special Verdict and Judgment finding Dr. Lahey
not guilty of negligence must be affirmed as no evidence was
produced at trial as to the standard of care applicable to
Dr. Lahey, breach of the standard of care, or causation.
Further, no party has challenged the appropriateness of the
Special Verdict and Judgment as to Dr. Lahey.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE SPECIAL VERDICT AND RESULTING
JUDGMENT FINDING NO NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF MICHAEL LAHEY, M.D.
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
At

the close

of LDS Hospital's

case, Plaintiff

moved for a directed virdict in favor of Dr. Lahey, and Dr.
Lloyd.

The District Court denied the Motion and included on

the Special Verdict form question 2(a), which asked whether
Dr. Lahey was negligent in his care of Betty George.

-5-

The

jury found that Dr. Lahey was not negligent.
The Special Verdict and Judgment in favor of Dr.
Lahey does not merit further consideration by this Court
because no evidence or testimony was produced at trial as to
the standard of care applicable to Dr. Lahey, breach of the
standard of care, or causation.
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that in a
medical malpractice action, plaintiff usually must provide
expert testimony establishing the standard of care or duty
owed by the physician, that the physician failed to comply
with the standard and that such conduct caused damage.

The

only exception is where the type of malpractice committed is
within the common knowledge and experience of lay people.
Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337 (Utah App. 1987), Nixdorf v.
Hicken, 712 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980), Fredrickson v. Maw, 227
P.2d 772 (Utah 1951).
During the course of the trial, no witness, expert
or

otherwise,

applicable

testified

to Dr. Lahey

conduct on his part.

regarding
or that

the

standard

of

care

there was any improper

The determination of the jury and the

Court that there was no negligence on Dr. Laheyfs part was
the only possible outcome.

-6-

II.

NO CHALLENGE HAS BEEN RAISED TO THE
APPROPRIATENESS
OF
THE
SPECIAL
VERDICT AND RESULTING JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF MICHAEL LAHEY, M.D.
As

can

be

seen

from

the Motion

for

New Trial

(Addendum "B"), and the Briefs filed by Plaintiff and L.D.S.
Hospital, no party has challenged the appropriateness of the
Special

Verdict

and

resulting

Judgment

in

favor

of Dr.

Lahey.

CONCLUSION

The Special Verdict and resulting Judgment in favor
of

Dr.

Lahey

determination

was
and

the

only

they

have

possible
not

District Court or this Court.

been

factual

and

challenged

legal
in the

The Judgment in favor of Dr.

Lahey should be affirmed.

-7-

Respectfully submitted this *•>-'*— day of November,
1989PP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

ANTHONY EYRE
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK
Attorneys for Defendan\/Respondent Michael
Lahey, M.D.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The
the

undersigned

hereby

certifies

that

on

c^O — day of November, 1989, four (4) true and correct

copies of the foregoing Defendant-Respondent Michael Lahey
M.D.'s Brief was served upon the following:

Elliott J. Williams
Larry R. Laycock
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Brinton R. Burbidge
Larry R. White
KIRTON McCONKIE & POELMAN
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Steve Russell
Kathryn Collard
COLLARD & RUSSELL
415 Judge Building
No. Eight East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDA

Tab A

!l ,fv

)%'J

' ] '•

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID GEORGE, et al.
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL

Civil No. C-87-4199
Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.
At the end of each proposition submitted to you, indicate
your finding by placing an "X" in the appropriate line.

If

there is preponderance of the evidence in favor of the
proposition, indicate by finding "yes."

If there is

preponderance of the evidence against the proposition, indicate
by finding "no."

If there is no preponderance of the evidence

either way on the proposition, indicate by answering "no."
We, the jury in this action, find the answers to the
questions propounded to us, as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1
A.

Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of Betty

George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

,A

OOOQO

B.

If you answered "yes" to question No. 3A above, then

and only then answer the following question:

Was the negligence

of Dr. Kimball Lloyd a proximate cause of the death of Betty
George and the damages claimad by David George and the heirs of
Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No
QUESTION NO. 2

A.

Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of Betty

George?
ANSWER:
B.

Yes

No

•**

If you answered "yes" to question No. 2A above, then

and only then answer the following question:

Was the negligence

of Dr. Michael Lahey a proximate cause of the death of Betty
George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of
Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No._
QUESTION NO. 3

A.

Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or

respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George?
ANSWER:
B.

Yes

*X

No

If you answered "yes" to No. 3A above, then answer

the following question:

Was the negligence of LDS Hospital

including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory therapists, a

-2-

nooo

proximate cause of the death of Betty George and Jie damages claiired by
David George and the heirs of Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

»\

If you answered lfno,f to question 3A or 3B, or if you found no
preponderance of the evidence either way, then answer no further questions.
QUESTION NO. 4
What is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by David George,
and the heirs of Betty George and the estate of Betty George?

Tnis question

should be answered only if you answered Myes,f to question No. 3A and 3B.
General Damages
a.

Loss of consortium

$

b.

Pain and suffering of Betty George

$

Special Damages including:
a.

FUneral and Burial expenses

$

b.

Medical expenses

$

c.

Lost income, benefits and household services

$

QUESTION NO. 5
Assessing a percentage only to a party or parties found negligent,
considering the negligence to amount to 100 percent, what percentage of
negligence is attributed to:
a.

Dr. Kimball Iloyd

%

b.

Dr. Michael Lahey

%

c.

LDS Hospital, its nurses
ancVor respiratory therapists
%

Total

100

%

-3-

Oonoog

Dated t h i s 2

day of

Aht-m^f

. 1988.

JURY IFoREPERSON
FOREPERSON

_4_

0OO400

David George aid the heirs of Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

»\

If you answered "no" to question 37v or 3B, or if you found no
preponderance of the evidence either way, then answer no further questions,
QUESTION HO. 4
Wliat is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by David George,
and the heirs of Betty George and the estate of Betty George? This question
should be answered only if you answered "yes" to question No. 3A and 3B.
General Damages
a.

Loss of consortium

$

b.

Pain and suffering of Betty George

$

Special Damages including:
a.

Funeral and Burial expenses

$

b.

Medical expenses

$

c.

Lost income, benefits and household services

$

QUESTION NO. 5
Assessing a percentage only to a party or parties found negligent,
considering the negligence to amount to 100 percent, wliat percentage of
negligence is attributed to:
a.

Dr. Kimball Lloyd

%

b.

Dr. Michael Lahey

%

c.

LDS Hospital, its nurses
anchor respiratory therapists
%

Total

100

%

-3-

(\ f\ r\ o O 9

Dated t h i s ^ d a y

of

/

'**

" *•< I ' .

1963.

/ . ' ..,/, -.'• (fr< / / / )
-+•—
JURY FOREPERSON

k

—A

_4_

onn/joo
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Steve Russell (A2831)
Kathryn Collard (0697)
COLLARD & RUSSELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
415 Judge Building
#8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-1664
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT - OR FOR A NEW
TRIAL
C i v i l No. C-87-4199

DAVID GEORGE,
Plaintiff,
v.
LDS HOSPITAL,

Judge Pat Brian
Defendants.

Plaintiff, by and through counsel, hereby moves the Court to
enter a Judgment in plaintiff's favor, Notwithstanding the Verdict
in the above-entitled case, pursuant to Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
This Motion is supported by the accompanying Affidavit of
plaintiff's

Trial

Counsel,

and

Memorandum

of

Points

and

Authorities.
Dated this

M

day of

iVpVembt-*- , 1988.

COLLARD & RUSSELL

ZJUi /a**-

Attorney for Plaintiff

0^

Steve Russell (A2831)
Kathryn Collard (0697)
COLLARD & RUSSELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
415 Judge Building
#8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-1664
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID GEORGE,

I

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. C-87-4199
LDS HOSPITAL,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

J
I

Judge Pat Brian

)
) ss.
)

STEVE RUSSELL and KATHRYN COLLARD, being first duly sworn,
depose and state:
1.

That we are legal counsel for the plaintiff in the

above-entitled matter, and were counsel in the trial of the case
which concluded on November 9, 1988.
2.

That plaintiff's "theory of the case" was simple and

straight forward, to wit:

The negligence of the LDS hospital

employees caused, contributed to the cause, or was a substantial
factor in the cause of Betty George's increasing respiratory
complications during her hospitalization; and further that the

nn^n

negligence of LDS Hospital on the afternoon of August 2, 1986
deprived Mrs. George of the opportunity of being diagnosed and
treated by competent physicians, thereby causing, or contributing
to the

cause

of her

arrest

that

evening,

followed

by

an

irreversible coma and subsequent death on August 4, 1986.
3.
what specific
the arrest.

In plaintiff's theory of the case, it didn't

matter

mechanism

caused

(i.e., hypoxia, sepsis, snakebite)

Plaintiff's case against LDS Hospital was premised on

the failure of the patient to receive necessary medical attention.
Plaintiff's duty in a medical malpractice is to prove that the
negligence (that is, the acts and omissions),
causally

connected

to the plaintiff's

of the hospital is

injuries

and damage.

Plaintiff's burden in this regard was correctly set forth in Jury
Instructions 16 and 21.
4.
to

prevent

If a patient needs diagnosis and treatment in order
or

lessen

the

severity

of

a

life-threatening

complication, and such diagnosis and treatment is not provided due
to the negligence of medical personnel responsible to report the
patient's condition - then it naturally follows that a jury could
find that such negligence caused or contributed to the cause of

the patient's injury regardless
condition

in
5.

of

the

specific

illness

or

question.
Plaintiff produced

the only

competent

expert

testimony on the negligence of the hospital nurses and respiratory
therapists from Harriet Gillerman, R.N., and Don Owings, R.T.

nn^R

6.

The jury found that LDS Hospital was negligent.

[Special Verdict, Question 3A.]
7.

Nurse Gillerman and Mr. Owings also testified, or at

least attempted to testify that the negligence of the LDS hospital
staff caused or contributed to the arrest suffered by Mrs. George,
by failing to report significant changes in her condition to
appropriate medical personnel including Mrs. George's treating
physicians.

The basis for their opinion was the obvious fact that

Mrs. George had not received the attention

of a competent

physician when needed.
In any event/ a jury does not need expert testimony to link
the negligent failure to procure necessary medical diagnosis and
treatment with a subsequent complication.
8.

There was a great deal of commotion, interruption

and argument focused on the competence of plaintiff's experts to
offer an opinion on the specific mechanism or condition which
caused Mrs. George's death.

Such was not the purpose of their

testimony.
9.

The undersigned assert that the matter of the

competence of plaintiff's experts was given undue attention, was
improperly brought into question, and that the Court's rulings on
the issue were unclear and confusing enough to cast doubt on the
credibility and weight to be accorded the testimony of plaintiff's
experts.

(This confusion and uncertainty was later fatally

compounded by the giving of Instruction 21A, as discussed below.)

on°ft4Q

10.

In fact, the opinions of plaintiff's experts were

subsequently confirmed by every physician who appeared in the
case.

Dr. Lloyd, Dr. Lahey, Dr. Trowbridge, Dr. Weinstein and Dr.

Elliot, all testified that Mrs. George's condition on August 2
mandated that the hospital staff assure that she was seen by a
physician for diagnosis and treatment.

Defendant's so-called

infectious disease experts all detailed numerous ways in which
"sepsis" is treated, and testified that the vast majority of their
septic patients do not arrest and die.
11.

Though

the

infection

experts,

based

on

a

retrospective examination of the record alone, described Mrs.
George's "sepsis" with varying degrees of incredible severity,
none of them stated any specific point in time after which
diagnosis and treatment by a competent M.D. would have been
futile.

The

testimony

of

all

of

the

physician

witnesses

supported the natural conclusion or inference that the negligence
of the hospital was a proximate cause of the patient's arrest and
subsequent death.
12.

While the experts were willing to say that silly

things like deep breathing would not have prevented the result,
none of them said that the full panoply of interventions in a

properly equipped and staffed ICU,
familiar

with,
13.

which they

all

use and are

would not have been enough.
As it was, defendant's infectious disease experts

were allowed to testify on the basis of total and complete

on°^

speculation.

The basis for each of their opinions was that Mrs.

George was overwhelmingly and unbelievably sick, yet the testimony
of the physicians and other medical personnel who were actually
with

Betty George on August 2nd completely contradicted the

premise of their opinions.

Plaintiff's repeated objections to the

absolutely speculative (and contrary to the evidence) testimony of
the hospital's experts were overruled by the Court.
14.

While plaintiff's experts were denied the chance to

render opinions and conclusions within the field of their training
and experience, and which hardly

could be said to

require

expertise (i.e. if a patient needs help and it's not provided the
patient's condition will get worse);

the hospital's experts were

allowed to journey into the farthest regions of speculation and
conjecture, to say that things never done would not have made a
difference, and to base their opinions on assumptions which were
patently untrue.

All of this, solely on the basis that they have

the privilege of appending their name with the initials "M.D."
15.

The "cause of death" of Betty George was a focal

point of numerous arguments before the Court at the bench, in
chambers, and in open Court.
16.

On at least three occasions, probably more, the

Court stated that the ultimate medical cause of death was "not in
issue" or that it was "irrelevant to the plaintiff's case" - which
was true.

on<-^*2

17.

That position was last restated during the lunch

break on the last day of trial.

At that time, the fact that LDS

Hospital intended to ground its entire defense on the "it didn't
matter what we did" theory was completely obvious, particularly
given the entirely speculative and inconclusive testimony of Dr.
Elliot.
18.

The principal matter discussed during that break

was the propriety of an instruction posed by defendant which was
later given as instruction 21A.
19.

This instruction had to be added to those which had

previously been discussed and agreed to by respective counsel with
the Court.
20.

It is plaintiff's counsel's recollection that the

instruction had previously fceen rejected because of the Court's
opinion that it x&s irrelevant.

rsee. plaintiff's worksheet

dealing with the proposed Instruction attached as EXHIBIT 2.]
During the afternoon break, after the interchange described above,
and when

it appeared that the Court

intended to give the

instruction anyway, plaintiff's counsel again inquired as to the
purpose of instructing the jury that plaintiff had the burden to
prove an irrelevant issue, particularly when plaintiff's burden to
prove proximate cause was set forth in a number of other proper
instructions.

The inquiry did not elicit a response from the

Court.
21.

Jury Instruction 21A read:

on°

You are instructed that where the proximate cause
of Betty George's death and therefore the injury
or loss claimed by the plaintiff is not established
by a preponderance of the evidence based on a
reasonable degree of medical probability from the
testimony of a medical doctor, but is left to
conjecture or speculation and may reasonably be
attributed to causes over which the hospital or
doctor had no control or responsibility, then
the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of
proof as to proximate cause. (Emphasis added.)
21A.

Jury Instruction 21A requires plaintiff to prove

"the proximate cause of death."

It is therefore an incorrect

statement of the law, and directly contradicts Jury Instruction
21, which correctly states that, "There may be more than one
proximate cause for an injury."
22.
prove

Jury Instruction 21A required the plaintiff to

"the cause of death" - an issue which the Court had

repeatedly and correctly stated was "not in issue" or "irrelevant"
in order for the plaintiff to prevail.
23

Jury Instruction 21A established an impossibility at

the time it was approved by the Court, by requiring that the
testimony be from a medical doctor.

The entire trial was about a

hospital and its nurses and respiratory

therapists.

Those

individuals are best qualified to testify about standard of care,
breach and the result of such a breach by nurses and respiratory
therapists.

Plaintiff

satisfied

its burden with

competent

testimony that the "overwhelming" (to borrow a term) negligence of
the hospital was a proximate cause of Betty George's arrest, from
which her death inevitably ensued.

on^tf*4

Instruction 21A prohibited the jury from considering the
competent testimony of Harriet Gillerman and Don Owings as to the
causal connection between the negligence of LDS Hospital and the
arrest and subsequent death, because those witnesses were not
M.D.'s.
24.

The

issue

of

"reasonable

degree

of

medical

probability" was followed with interest, and later consternation-,
by plaintiff's counsel.

It appeared from the Court's rulings,

that the Court believed that a nurse with 25 years of impeccable
qualifications and credentials was incapable of speaking with any
degree of medical probability, and yet the pronouncements of an
M.D. were automatically imbued with a reasonable degree of medical
probability.
25.
quantify

At no time did any of defendants

"experts"

in any respect what degree of medical probability

attached to their opinions, nor why anyone except them would
consider

their

opinions

more probable

than

anything else.

Nevertheless, it was routinely sufficient for a witness like Dr.
Elliot to- answer "yes" to the question: "Is your opinion based on
a reasonable degree of medical probability?" (as if the term was
commonly understood) , in order to be elevated in status and
weight.
26.

Plaintiff was entitled to have his theory of the

case put to the jury in the form of instructions from the Court.
27.

In the numerous discussions with the Court,

00°

including the one on the last day of trial, it was pointed out
that, not only would an instruction like 21A require plaintiff to
prove an irrelevant issue to prevail, but that it would provide
the defendant hospital with a defense which could be relied on to
confuse and mislead the jury.
28.

Jury Instruction 21A was completely contrary to

plaintiff's theory of the case.
29.

At the same time, Jury Instruction 21A provided the

defense with a position based on an irrelevant issue which was
later relied on almost exclusively as a means to avoid liability.
30.

Sure enough, defense counsel in closing employed

the famous, "You can't get there from here" theory to argue that
jbecause the patient died

of

sepsis,

which was not the result of

any negligence attributable to the hospital, plaintiff could not
recover.
31.

Defense

counsel's

argument

on the

causation

question focused exclusively on the plaintiff's irrelevant burden
set forth in 21A.

The instruction was re-read by defense counsel

and referred to continually in closing argument-.
32.

On November LO ~aird"~16, 1988. plaintiff's counsel

contacted the jury foremen, Mr. Ralph smith, to determine the
basis for the jury's decision.

Mr. Smith"indicated that the issue

of the hospital's negligence was "the easiest question the jury
had, and the only one all the jurors readily agreed on."

Mr.

Smith further stated that the jury's deliberations on causation

on

were focused entirely on the requirement set forth in Instruction
21A, which resulted in the jury's negative answer to Question 3B
on the Jury Verdict Form.

rsee. the AFFIDAVIT OF RALPH SMITH,

attached.]
33.

It is the opinion of plaintiff's counsel that the

inclusion of Instruction 21A was plain error, ami that it was
prejudicial

in the extreme.

It is further the opinion of

plaintiff's counsel that this error was compounded in at least two
very critical respects.
34.

First, it was plain error to include any reference

to Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey in the jury instructions or the Special
Verdict form.
35.

No witness, expert or otherwise said one word about

the standard of care applicable to Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey.
36.

No witness, expert or otherwise, stated that Dr.

Lloyd or Dr. Lahey had violated the unknown standard of care in
any respect.
37.

The Court indicated during the lunch break of the

last day of trial that the jury might infer

that the doctors

should have diagnosed an infection in the patient.

The making of

such an inference, even if there was testimony to support it,
which testimony was not heard by the undersigned counsel, is
absolutely prohibited in a medical malpractice case.

This is

particularly true when the jury would first have to speculate on

n r\ r\

what the standard of care required, before it could speculate on
whether it was breached,
38.

No M.D. testified with any degree of medical

certainty how Drs. Lloyd and Lahey breached the undefined standard
of care, what the standard of care required them to do instead, or
what the proximate cause of the non-existent breach of the unknown
standard was.
39.

The

jury was

specifically

instructed not to

speculate with respect to these matters involving Dr. Lloyd and
Dr. Lahey in instructions 22, 29 and 30.

The jury was then

required to speculate as to Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey

on the

Special Verdict Form.
40.

The jury correctly determined that there was no

evidence to support a finding of negligence against the physician
defendants.
The point here being, while the jury was allowed to
speculate

about

the

physician

defendants,

Instruction

21A

prohibited the jury from considering competent evidence that the
clear negligence of the hospital was causally connected to the
plaintiff's injuries and damage.
41.

The

error

inherent

in

the

giving

of

Jury

Instruction 21A was further compounded by time limitations being
placed on plaintiff's counsel's closing argument, and particularly
by the denial of the plaintiff's right to rebut the closing
argument of defense counsel.

on

42.
to estimate

During the first week of trial, counsel was asked

the time that would be needed for closing argument.

Plaintiff's counsel indicated 75-90 minutes.

The Court allowed

plaintiff's counsel to split his argument, and thereafter, counsel
made efforts to structure an argument within those limits.
43.

On the last day of trial three events occurred

which dramatically altered what was needed to be accomplished in
closing.

Those were:
a.

The Court's denial of plaintiff's Motion for a

Directed Verdict as to Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey;
b.

The rather incredible testimony of Dr. Elliot,

who was apparently prepared to irrevocably seal the fate of Betty
George as of sometime on July 30, 1986; and
c.

The inclusion of Instruction 21A, together with

the fact that it was obvious the hospital would rely on it
exclusively in an attempt to avoid liability.
44.

During counsel's closing argument an error in the

Special Verdict form became apparent-

(That having to do with the

right of the plaintiff to recover damages for the estate of Betty
George pursuant to §78-11-12, U.C.A.)
45.

In a subsequent meeting in chambers the error was

corrected, but the Court advised that counsel would h&fa only 5
minutes to complete his argument.

Worse, the Court inTiiQated in

the presence of defense counsel that no rebuttal would be allowed.

n<*

46.

The undersigned acknowledges that 90 minutes had

been taken in argument, and that the 5 minutes allowed by the
Court probably

meant that plaintiff's

argument

exceeded

90

minutes.
47.

However, at the time the Court limited plaintiff's

argument, plaintiff's counsel had 20-30 minutes left of planned
argument including several extremely important points, such as:
a.

The role of the second year resident Carol

Adams, (which portion of the argument had to be omitted.);
b.

The

plaintiff's

position,

supported

by

competent expert testimony, that the knowledge of Adams, whatever
it was, did not excuse the continuing failure of the LDS Hospital
staff to make sure the true condition of Betty George was made
known to a competent physician, along with the nurses unqualified
request that diagnosis and treatment be immediately initiated;
c.

Further

argument

that

the

testimony

of

defendant's experts was entirely speculative and untrustworthy;
but even if believed was not inconsistent with plaintiff's theory
that the failure of the hospital staff was a proximate cause of
the arrest since it deprived the patient of having any chance of
having her sepsis (assuming its existence) diagnosed and treated
before it was too late; and
d.

almost all of plaintiff's argument as to the

damage issues.

on

48.

The undersigned counsel further contend that the

denial of plaintiff1s right to rebut the defense argument put
defense counsel in the position of taking a "free swing" with the
knowledge that errors and false statements would not be subject to
correction•
49.

Defense

counsel

took

full

advantage

of the

situation by knowingly making false and inflammatory statements
with respect to the non-appearance of a critical witness (Nurse
Soraghan); by knowingly making false and inflammatory statements
about the settlement plaintiff had previously negotiated with Drs.
Lloyd and Lahey; and by hammering at the notion that because some
experts had made an after-the-fact diagnosis of sepsis as being
the cause of death, that the hospital's failure

to see that the

patient received necessary medical attention was somehow excused.
This argument was based entirely on the authority of Instruction
21A.
50.

Plaintiff's inability to rebut the closing argument

of defendant constituted the unnecessary denial of a fundamental
right and was prejudicial to plaintiff in the extreme.
51.

Based

on all of the above, as well

accompanying Memorandum

as the

of Points and Authorities, and the

Affidavit of Ralph Smith, plaintiff requests that the Court enter
a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict in his favor, or, in the
alternative, a New Trial.
Dated this e&

day of Ntl/MV^

, 1988.

0^

Steve Russell

Kathryn G M 1 a i ^ ^
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

On the ofaod> day of \ ^ytn^Otf*

, 1988, personally appeared

before me, STEVE RUSSELL and KATHRYN COLLARD, who signed the
within AFFIDAVIT.

In addition, Steve Russell and Kathryn Collard

stated that they had read the document, were familiar with its
contents, and that the facts, observations and opinions stated
herein are true and correct to the best of their knowledge,
information and belief.

My Commission Expires:

:-\ i-l )-fJ/J.
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